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Abstract. We use bounds of exponential sums to show that for a wide
class of parameters the modiﬁcation of the DSA signature scheme pro-
posed by A. K. Lenstra at Asiacrypt’96 is as secure as the original scheme.
1 Introduction
Let p and q ≥ 3 be prime numbers with q|p − 1. As usual IFp and IFq denote
ﬁelds of p and q elements which we assume to be represented by the elements
{0, . . . , p− 1} and {0, . . . , q − 1}, respectively.
For a rational number z and m ≥ 1 we denote by zm the unique integer a,
0 ≤ a ≤ m− 1 such that a ≡ z (mod m) (provided that the denominator of z is
relatively prime to m).
The Digital Signature Algorithm, or DSA, can be described in the following
way. Let M be the set of messages to be signed and let h : M −→ IFq be an
arbitrary hash-function. Let g ∈ IFp be a ﬁxed element of multiplicative order q,
that is, gq = 1, which is publicly known (as well as p and q). Finally, ﬁx a certain
element α ∈ IF∗q which is the secret key known only to the signer. For a message
µ ∈ M we select a random element k ∈ IF∗q called a nonce and we deﬁne the
function
r(k) =
⌊⌊
gk
⌋
p
⌋
q
and s(k, µ) =
⌊
k−1 (h(µ) + αr(k))
⌋
q
. (1)
The pair (r(k), s(k, µ)) is the DSA signature of the message µ with nonce k.
Modular inversion of the nonce k in (1) is a time consuming operation. To
improve the performance several inversion-free modiﬁcations of the basic scheme
have been proposed, see [13] as well as Sections 11.5.2 and 11.5.4 in [8] and
Section 20.4 of [14]. On the other hand, these schemes, although quite close
to the original DSA scheme, may not be compatible with it, see the discussion
in [6]. Thus to overcome the incompatibility problem (and a large signature size
for some of the aforementioned modiﬁcations) a very diﬀerent algorithm has
been proposed in [6]. This algorithm follows the basic DSA scheme except that
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the nonce k is generated in a special way which allows to generate k and
⌊
k−1
⌋
q
simultaneously at reasonably low computational cost.
The algorithm from [6] works as follows, in a special partial case. Given a prime
q and two more integer parameters T ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1:
◦ Select independently and uniformly at random 2m integers t1, . . . , t2m ∈
[2, T ];
◦ For i = 1, . . . , 2m, compute ui =
⌊
q−1
⌋
ti
and wi = (qui − 1)/ti;
◦ For i = 1, . . . , 2m, using the identity t−1i ≡ wi (mod q), compute vi =⌊
t−1i
⌋
q
;
◦ Compute and output
κ = t1 . . . tmvm+1 . . . v2mq and λ = v1 . . . vmtm+1 . . . t2mq.
It is easy to see that λ =
⌊
κ−1
⌋
q
. The eﬃciency of the algorithm is based
on the observation that for each arithmetic operation it performs one of the
operands is of size T . Furthermore, once qti has been computed, the inversion
required for the computation of ui involves only numbers of size ≤ T . Thus
if the bit length of T is essentially smaller than the bit length of q and m is
reasonably small this algorithm is faster than the standard inversion modulo q
using the Extended Euclid Algorithm. The eﬃciency of this algorithm (and its
slightly more general form described in [6]) has been numerically veriﬁed, see [6]
and Section 4.
However, it has remained an open question whether this new way of gener-
ating k and
⌊
k−1
⌋
q
undermines the security of the DSA. In [6, Section 3] some
heuristic arguments in support of the security of the new scheme are given. At
the rumpsession of Asiacrypt’96, S. Vaudenay [16] presented a partial cryptanal-
ysis of the scheme that only aﬀected the security if the ti are chosen in some
particularly bad way that is explicitly excluded in [6, Section 3].
In this paper we show that using bounds of character sums one can establish
rigorous security results for the above scheme (for some values of the parameters
T and m). In fact we show that the distribution of the value of κ is exponentially
close to the uniform distribution. Therefore any algorithm attacking this modiﬁ-
cation immediately implies an attack on the original scheme with exponentially
close probabilities of success.
More precisely, for k ∈ IF∗q , let Pm,T (k) be the probability that the output κ
of the above algorithm equals k. We use some known bounds of exponential sums
to prove that for a wide range of parameters T and m the statistical distance
∆(m,T ) =
∑
k∈IF∗q
∣∣∣∣Pm,T (k)− 1q − 1
∣∣∣∣ (2)
is exponentially small, namely
∆(m,T ) < q−δ
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for some constant δ > 0. The range of parameters allowed by this general result
do, however, not seem to be of much practical value. We show that under the
assumption of the Extended Riemann Hypothesis an essentially stronger result
can be obtained that allows parameter choices in a more realistic and practical
range.
We stress that the uniformity of distribution of the nonce k is absolutely
essential. Indeed, it has been shown in the series of papers [5,10,11] that the
knowledge of some bits of k can be used to break the DSA (that is, recovering
the private key α) in polynomial time.
2 Preparations
Let X be the set of multiplicative characters of the multiplicative group IF∗q ,
see Section 1 of Chapter 5 of [7]. We denote by X ∗ the subset of non-trivial
characters.
We deﬁne
σ(T ) = max
χ∈X∗
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Lemma 1. For any integers T ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1 the bound
∆(m,T ) < q1/2σ(T )2m−1T−2m+1/2
holds for the statistical distance ∆(m,T ) given by (2).
Proof. Let Nm,T (k) be the number of sequences t1, . . . , t2m ∈ [2, T ] for which
t1 . . . tmt
−1
m+1 . . . t
−1
2m ≡ k (mod q). Then Pm,T (k) = Nm,T (k)T−2m.
From the following well-known identity
∑
χ∈X
χ(z) =
{
q − 1, if z = 1,
0, otherwise,
which holds for any z ∈ IF∗q (cf. [7, Theorem 5.4]), we derive
Nm,T (k) =
1
q − 1
T∑
t1,...,t2m=2
∑
χ∈X
χ(t1 . . . tmt−1m+1 . . . t
−1
2mk
−1).
We remark that χ(λ−1) = χ(λ) for λ ∈ IF∗q and that zz = |z|2, where z¯ denotes
the conjugate of a complex number z. Therefore, changing the order of summa-
tion, separating the term T 2m/(q−1) which corresponds to the trivial character,
and noting that k−1 runs through IF∗q together with k we obtain
∣∣∣∣Nm,T (k)− T
2m
q − 1
∣∣∣∣ = 1q − 1
∑
χ∈X∗
χ(k)
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2m
.
On the Security of Lenstra’s Variant of DSA without Long Inversions 67
Therefore
∑
k∈IF∗q
∣∣∣∣Nm,T (k)− T
2m
q − 1
∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
(q − 1)2
∑
k∈IF∗q

∑
χ∈X∗
χ(k)
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2m


2
=
1
(q − 1)2
∑
k∈IF∗q
∑
χ1,χ2∈X∗
χ1(k)χ2(k)
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ1(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2m ∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ2(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2m
=
1
(q − 1)2
∑
χ1,χ2∈X∗
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ1(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2m ∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ2(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2m ∑
k∈IF∗q
χ1(k)χ2(k).
Using that the product of two characters is a character as well and the identity
∑
k∈IF∗q
χ(k) =
{
q − 1, if χ = χ0,
0, otherwise,
where χ0 is the trivial character (cf. [7, Theorem 5.4]), we see that the inner
sum vanishes unless
χ2(k) = χ1(k)−1 = χ1(k−1) = χ1(k), k ∈ IF∗q ,
in which case it is equal to q − 1. Therefore
∑
k∈IF∗q
∣∣∣∣Nm,T (k)− T
2m
q − 1
∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
q − 1
∑
χ∈X∗
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2m ∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(k)
∣∣∣∣∣
2m
=
1
q − 1
∑
χ∈X∗
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
4m
≤ σ(T )
4m−2
q − 1
∑
χ∈X∗
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
We have
1
q − 1
∑
χ∈X∗
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
<
1
q − 1
∑
χ∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= T.
Hence
∑
k∈IF∗q
∣∣∣∣Pm,T (k)− T
2m
q − 1
∣∣∣∣
2
≤ T−4m
∑
k∈IF∗q
∣∣∣∣Nm,T (k)− T
2m
q − 1
∣∣∣∣
2
≤ σ(T )4m−2T−4m+1.
From the Cauchy inequality we obtain the desired result.
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Thus to estimate the statistical distance we need upper bounds on σ(T ). The
simplest and the most well known bound is given by the Polya–Vinogradov in-
equality
σ(T ) ≤ q1/2 ln q,
see [9, Theorem 2.2], which is non-trivial only for T ≥ q1/2+ε. However such
values of T are too large to be useful for our application. Instead we use the
Burgess bound, see [9, Theorem 2.3].
Lemma 2. For any ε > 0 there exists γ > 0 such that
σ(T ) ≤ Tq−γ
for T ≥ q1/4+ε and suﬃciently large q.
It is known that the Extended Riemann Hypothesis , or ERH, implies non-
trivial upper bounds for much shorter sums. We therefore use a result that relies
on the assumption of the ERH. In particular, we use a bound which follows from
one of the results of [3].
Lemma 3. Let
v =
lnT
ln ln q
→∞.
Then, assuming the ERH, the bound
σ(T ) ≤ Tv−v/2+o(v)
holds.
Proof. We recall that an integer n ≥ 1 is called Y -smooth if all primes dividing
it are ≤ Y . Let Ψ(X,Y ) denote the total number of Y -smooth numbers ≤ X.
The following estimate is a substantially relaxed and simpliﬁed version of [4,
Corollary 1.3]. Let X = Y u; then for any u → ∞ with u ≤ Y 1/2 we have the
bound
Ψ(X,Y ) Xu−u+o(u). (3)
It has been proved in [3, Theorem 2] that
σ(T ) = O
(
Ψ
(
T, ln2 q ln20 ln q
))
,
provided that u → ∞. One easily veriﬁes that the bound (3) can be applied to
the last function with u = v/2 + o(v), producing the desired result.
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3 Main Results
Now we are prepared to prove our main results.
Theorem 1. For any ε > 0 and A ≥ 0 there exists a constant m0(ε,A) > 0
such that for any integers T ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1 satisfying the inequalities
T ≥ q1/4+ε and m ≥ m0(ε)
the statistical distance ∆(m,T ) given by (2) satisﬁes the bound ∆(m,T ) ≤ q−A.
Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain the bound
∆(m,T ) < q1/2T−1/2q−γ(2m−1) ≤ q1/4−γ(2m−1) ≤ q−A
provided that m ≥ (4A+ 1)/8γ + 1.
Unfortunately the range of parameters allowed by Theorem 1 does not seem to
be of any practical value. However under the ERH an essentially stronger result
can be obtained.
Theorem 2. Assume the ERH. Then for any A > 0 and any integers T ≥ 2
and m ≥ 1 such that
v =
lnT
ln ln q
→∞ and m ≥ (2A+ 1) ln q
v ln v
+ 1
for suﬃciently large q, the statistical distance ∆(m,T ) given by (2) satisﬁes the
bound ∆(m,T ) ≤ q−A.
Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 3 we obtain the bound
∆(m,T ) < q1/2T−1/2v−(v/2+o(v))(2m−1) ≤ q1/2v−v(2m−1)/3
≤ q1/2−(4A+2)/3 ≤ q−A,
provided that q is large enough.
In particular, if q is about n bits long and T is selected about ) bits long with
) ≥ lnn1+ε, then for m of order n/ ln ) the algorithm of [6] generates a secure
sequence of pairs κ, λ =
⌊
κ−1
⌋
q
. Thus the values of T used in this algorithm can
be rather small.
4 Practical Considerations
In [6] it was shown that generating k and
⌊
k−1
⌋
q
simultaneously as indicated in
Section 1 and with m = 3 is about as fast as the regular method of computing⌊
k−1
⌋
q
given a random k, for the common values n = 160 and ) = 32 where n and
) are the bit lengths of q and T , respectively. In the analysis of [6] it was assumed
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that the regular method makes use of Lehmer’s method for the inversion. Thus,
in environments where Lehmer’s inversion is available there does not seem to be
any good reason not to generate k and
⌊
k−1
⌋
q
in the regular way.
Lehmer’s method is about twice faster than regular modular inversion (which is
based directly on the Extended Euclidean Algorithm) because it replaces most
of the extended precision integer divisions by ﬂoating point approximations. The
disadvantage of Lehmer’s method is, however, that it takes substantially more
code and memory than regular modular inversion (or than the method from [6]).
For computation in more restricted environments (such as a credit card chip)
where the space and size needs of Lehmer’s method cannot be met, the method
of [6] may therefore be an option, because it would be faster than regular modular
inversion, even if m is taken as large as 6.
Theorem 2, however, indicates that for n = 160 and ) = 32 security can be
guaranteed (under the ERH) only for substantially larger choices for m, namely
m should be at least about 100. Obviously, such large m severely limit the prac-
tical applicability of the method from [6] reviewed in Section 1, assuming that
provable security of the choice of k is required: implementation of the method
makes sense only if very limited space is available, and division of extended pre-
cision integers (as required for regular modular inversion) is not available. It
should be kept in mind, however, that the results presented in this paper are
just theoretical lower bounds for the security and that in practice much smaller
values of m should give satisfactory results, as also indicated in [6]. In fact even
our theoretical results can be improved and extended; some further possibilities
are indicated in Section 5. We do not present them here because our main moti-
vation has been to indicate a possible way to establish rigorous proofs of security
of the approach proposed in [6], rather than deriving all possible results of this
kind.
An alternative way of using the idea behind the method from [6] in the
vein of the method of [1], as informally and independently proposed by several
diﬀerent people, is as follows. Compute and store S1 = {t1, . . . , t2r} and the
corresponding S2 = {v1, . . . , v2r} for some large value of r and compute the
products over the four relevant random subsets of size m of S1
⋃
S2 for each
pair k,
⌊
k−1
⌋
q
to be generated, where r is substantially larger than m. Given
the successful attack (cf. [12]) on the method from [1], however, this approach
cannot be recommended.
5 Remarks
The algorithm itself as well as all our main tools, can be extended to composite
moduli. The only diﬀerence is that Lemma 2 holds in the present form only for
square-free moduli, however a slightly weaker result is known in the general case
as well (which is nontrivial for T ≥ q3/8+ε).
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One can also remark that if T 2ν < q for an integer ν ≥ 1 then
∑
χ∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
t=2
χ(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2ν
= (q − 1)Mν(T ),
where Mν(T ) is the number of solutions of the equation (rather than a congru-
ence)
t1 . . . tν = tν+1 . . . t2ν , t1, . . . , t2ν ∈ [2, T ]
which can be estimated using various number theoretic tools. In particular, the
bound
Mν(T ) ≤ T ν (1 + (ν − 1) lnT )ν
2−1
has been given in [15, Lemma 4].
It is also worth mentioning that, under the ERH, one can improve Theorem 1
(and Theorem 2 for larger values of T ). Namely, for any ε > 0, the ERH implies
the bound
σ(T ) = O(T 1/2qε). (4)
In fact, using the so-called “large sieve” method one can probably obtain
quite strong unconditional results for “almost all” q rather than for all of them
(which still suﬃces for cryptographic applications).
On the other hand, there are inﬁnitely many primes q such that for T =
O(log q) and any m ≥ 1 the statistical distance ∆(m,T ) is very large. Indeed,
it has been shown in [2] that there exists a constant c > 0 such that for in-
ﬁnitely many primes q the smallest quadratic non-residue modulo q is at least
c log q log log log q (under the ERH the same result is known with c log q log log q).
Therefore for such q, T = c log q log log log q and anym ≥ 1 we have Pm,T (k) =
0 whenever k is one of the (q−1)/2 quadratic non-residues modulo q. Therefore,
in this case ∆(m,T ) ≥ 1/2. It should be noted that a large statistical distance
does not imply that the corresponding signature scheme is insecure.
A more general modiﬁcation of the algorithm from [6] (where some of the ti
and vi are alternated in a random fashion in the expressions for κ and λ) can be
studied quite analogously.
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